

**“A REPORT CARD ON
HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING”**

STATEMENT OF

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BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION
SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT**

**COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
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**Statement of
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and
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**Before the
Subcommittee on Intelligence,
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**Committee on Homeland Security
United States House of Representatives**

“A Report Card on Homeland Security Information Sharing”

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Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for convening this hearing today to focus on homeland security information sharing – an activity that is critical to making our communities, our states, and our nation safer. I want to acknowledge the hard work of my many colleagues at all levels of government, but especially those at the local and state level with whom I work. I’m also especially pleased to appear today with this distinguished panel of witnesses.

I appreciate this opportunity to provide an update on homeland security information sharing from the perspective of local, tribal, and state officials, and especially of those who work in the law enforcement and homeland security information sharing and criminal intelligence domains.

INTRODUCTION

Because this is my first time appearing before the Subcommittee, I would like to highlight my professional experience as it relates to the subject of this hearing. I began

my career as a local law enforcement officer in 1978. Since 1984 I have been continuously assigned full-time to the law enforcement intelligence discipline, and now hold the rank of Director at the Iowa Department of Public Safety where I report to the [Commissioner of Public Safety](#) for the State of Iowa. At the national and international level, I have been elected by my peers and am now serving my second two-year term as General Chairman of the [Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit](#), the oldest professional association of law enforcement intelligence units in the U.S. I also currently serve as Chairman of the [Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council](#) (CICC), and as Chairman of the [Global Intelligence Working Group](#) (GIWG) (part of the [Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative](#), a Federal Advisory Committee to the Attorney General of the United States). I am a member of the [Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group \(ITACG\) Advisory Council](#), which as you know was created in 2007 and is chaired by the Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and of the Advisory Board for DHS's Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS SLIC). Additionally, I currently serve on the [National Fusion Center Coordination Group](#); the Police Investigative Operations Committee for the [International Association of Chiefs of Police \(IACP\)](#); the Executive Advisory Board for the [International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts \(IALEIA\)](#); and the Advisory Board for Michigan State University's [Criminal Justice Intelligence Program](#). I previously participated in the monthly meetings of the U.S. Department of [Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council](#) at FBI Headquarters, and served as a Fusion Group Subject Matter Expert for the Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's [Homeland Security Advisory Council \(HSAC\)](#), and for the [LLIS](#) Intelligence Requirements Initiative. At the state level, I lead our state's fusion center, and serve as a member of the Executive Committee and the Operating Council for the [Safeguard Iowa Partnership](#), a voluntary coalition of the state's business and government leaders, who share a commitment to combining their efforts to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from catastrophic events in Iowa. I assisted with drafting the [IACP's Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, State, and Federal Levels](#) in 2002; Global's [National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan](#) in 2003; the

HSAC's [Homeland Security Intelligence and Information Fusion](#) report in 2005; and the jointly-issued Global – DOJ – DHS [Fusion Center Guidelines](#) in 2006. Since the creation of the Global Intelligence Working Group in 2002 until my appointment as CICC and GIWG Chairman in December 2007, I served as the Chairman of the GIWG's Privacy and Civil Liberties Task Team. During the past several years I have worked closely with our federal partners on the joint delivery of training and technical assistance regarding privacy and civil liberties protections in fusion centers. In 2007 I was awarded the [IALEIA](#) President's Distinguished Service Award, and in 2008 I received the [IACP Civil Rights Award](#) in the category of Individual Achievement for a "consistent and vocal presence in law enforcement stressing the importance of protecting civil rights in policy, training and ethical practice of the intelligence function."

Thus, because of the responsibilities associated with each of these roles and initiatives, I work closely and regularly not only with my local and state counterparts in homeland security information sharing, but also with our federal partners. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge our work with and the support received from U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and especially the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), with strong support received from the Bureau of Justice Assistance; the Federal Bureau of Investigation through their National Security Branch; the Program Manager's Office of the Information Sharing Environment; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Finally, much of the progress that has been made in homeland security information sharing is made possible by a collaboration of local, tribal, state, and federal agencies who are part of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global), the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, and the Global Intelligence Working Group. These are colleagues who, as a community, commit countless hours of their time each day to improve information sharing in the United States, including help to establish an effective national, integrated network of fusion centers in support of homeland security information sharing.

HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
AND INFORMATION SHARING: FUSION CENTERS

“Of all the functions and capabilities encompassed in the term “homeland security,” none is more important than intelligence.”

America At Risk: A Homeland Security Report Card, p. 8¹

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, law enforcement and other government agencies joined together to strengthen information and intelligence sharing and analysis capabilities. Many State and major urban areas have since established information fusion centers to coordinate the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, public-safety, and terrorism intelligence and information.

The *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007* (P.L.110-53), enacted in August 2007, endorsed and formalized the development of a national network of State and major urban area fusion centers. Similarly, the *National Strategy for Information Sharing* released by the White House in October 2007 also describes fusion centers as “a valuable information sharing resource,” and as “vital assets critical to sharing information.” The *Strategy* further states, “A sustained Federal partnership with State and major urban area fusion centers is critical to the safety of our Nation, and therefore a national priority.”² As one recent report noted:

“The potential value of fusion centers is clear: by integrating the various streams of information and intelligence from Federal, state, local, and tribal sources, as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructures and communities can be developed and translated into protective action.”³

¹ Progressive Policy Institute. 2003 (July). *America At Risk: A Homeland Security Report Card*. Accessed July 3, 2004 at http://www.ppionline.org/documents/HomeSecRptCrd_0703.pdf.

² The White House. 2007 (October). *National Strategy for Information Sharing*, p. A1-1, accessed September 21, 2008 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/NSIS_book.pdf.

³ U.S. House of Representatives, Report 110-752, Report to Accompany H.R.6098, Personnel

In my experience, fusion centers have emerged as what may be the most significant change in the structural landscape of criminal intelligence in at least the past twenty-five years. Continued support to and coordination with fusion centers is essential. Because these are led and operated by local and state governments, and because responsibilities and laws vary among local and state governments, there is no single structure or governance form for fusion centers. Additionally, because these entities remain relatively nascent, their capabilities are developing at different rates. Thus, the day-to-day management of, governance of, capabilities for, and intra- and interstate coordination among fusion centers differs and is based on these diverse and changing conditions. At this time, relationships with federal agencies may also vary from one center to the next.

The perspective that I offer today is based in part on my thirty years of experience as a law enforcement officer – twenty-four of those years assigned full-time and continuously to the law enforcement intelligence discipline, and most recently as the Director of a State Fusion Center. In some places, my statement is extensively augmented by the views of other local and state law enforcement professionals. Earlier this month, I informally surveyed members of LEIU and leaders from fusion centers across the United States. I asked them to share their views as they relate to homeland security information sharing. Specifically, I asked them to provide their input on (a) what’s working, (b) what could be improved, and (c) what recommendations they would offer as a “way forward” in the months and years ahead. I sincerely appreciate and respect their views, and any errors of commission or omission in representing them are mine, and mine alone.

WHAT WORKS

As a community, we have seen incremental but significant improvements in many areas of homeland security information sharing. I will begin by highlighting just a few of these initiatives that have proven to be valuable at the state and local level.

Reimbursement for Intelligence Cooperation and Enhancement of Homeland Security Act. Accessed September 21, 2008 at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi->

Leveraging of existing programs. Many improvements related to homeland security information sharing have been achieved when local and state officials leveraged successful and proven programs that have been in place for years. These include the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS®) and RISS' associated network (RISSNET™) and the RISS Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX™) (supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance), as well as the FBI's Law Enforcement Online (LEO). These programs have served as staples for many agencies that are engaged in homeland security information sharing. The services associated with these existing systems have also expanded to meet the needs of local and state officials, such as the development of RISSafe (an event deconfliction system) and LEO's Virtual Command Center (VCC) (an electronic information sharing and crisis management command center).

Emphasis on protecting privacy and civil liberties. From a policy, technical assistance, and training standpoint, the protection of privacy and civil liberties has been consistently emphasized among those at the local, tribal, state, and federal levels who are working together to provide support to and coordination of the fusion center implementation effort. The jointly-offered (rather than separately delivered) training and technical assistance initiatives made available to fusion centers by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice, supported by work from the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and with the assistance of the FBI, PM-ISE, and the ODNI, have made significant progress in providing real protections for privacy and civil liberties in the environment in which information is being shared. The joint DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program has been providing, and continues to provide, technical assistance in the area of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights policy development. This technical assistance was provided in late 2007 to all fusion centers as part of a series of regional meetings which focused on the topic. During these sessions, fusion center personnel were provided with information on the history described above, and on the importance of ensuring that privacy, civil liberties, and civil

rights are protected. The training and technical assistance sessions also included a hands-on workshop, where attendees were guided by subject matter experts through the completion of a privacy policy development template. At the completion of the sessions, attendees were asked to complete their draft privacy policies for their fusion centers, and were offered personalized technical assistance, via e-mail, phone, or on-site if needed, in order to facilitate completion of the policies. DHS and DOJ continue to follow-up with all fusion centers to provide every possible avenue of assistance in this important area.

Regional meetings, personal contacts. The development of regional working group meetings in several areas of the United States has been cited as an improvement to our national information sharing capacity. Some of this enhancement to homeland security information sharing is based on the development of personal contacts among fusion center personnel, which facilitates information sharing. But participants say that these regional meetings also allow them to leverage existing knowledge in the areas of policy and procedure, training, intelligence and information sharing technologies, staffing requirements, and other areas. Respondents believe that continued involvement with the working groups will continue to improve homeland security information sharing strategies in the future.

Collocated environment with clear and mutually-shared homeland security objectives. Comments from my local and state colleagues also point to an overall improvement in communication and information sharing with their federal partners in recent years (sometimes referred to as vertical information sharing), as well as to significant improvements in information sharing among state and local agencies (i.e., horizontal information sharing), based relationships and trust. For example, a fusion center leader described improved information sharing as it related to a recent National Special Security Event (NSSE). The fusion center leader said that this improvement was specifically noted in the interactions among personnel at a central information and intelligence center, which was hosted by a federal agency. Representatives from all major agencies were present in the center, which became the clearinghouse for security-related information and intelligence sharing for the event. During the planning cycle for

the NSSE, local, state, and federal representatives spent a great deal of time working together to share information toward a specific goal. These interactions helped build relationships and trust, which ultimately fostered a very open environment within the center. This fusion center leader also noted that because of established relationships with other fusion centers, the personnel at the information and intelligence center were able to quickly obtain needed information and intelligence to support the mission of providing security to the event in that state.

Training and Technical Assistance. Local and state officials note there has been a great deal of progress with training programs that enhance homeland security information sharing. Courses like the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program, the Criminal Intelligence Commanders Course, the Criminal Intelligence for the Chief Executive briefing, and the 28 CFR Part 23 training programs (all of which have been supported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance), and intelligence analyst training programs such as the Fundamentals of Intelligence Training (FIAT) (provided by IALEIA, LEIU, and the National White Collar Crime Center) have greatly improved the ability of local and state agencies to carry out homeland security information sharing and criminal intelligence efforts. Additionally, one of the significant bright spots in support of local, state, tribal, and federal information sharing has been the partnerships established among DHS, and especially the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and FEMA; DOJ, and especially BJA; the FBI; the PM-ISE; the ODNI; and Global, the CICC, and the GIWG. These groups have worked together to jointly sponsor training and technical assistance, information sharing meetings, the National Fusion Center Conference, and other valuable and cost-effective initiatives.

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) outreach. The Terrorist Screening Center has made great strides in the past year in sharing aggregate information with local and state officials, through the TSC's relationship with state and major urban area fusion centers. This aggregated information, as well as the tactical information affirmatively shared on a case-by-case basis, provided excellent situational awareness for fusion centers.

HS SLIC. Created in 2006, the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS SLIC) allows a nationwide network of intelligence personnel – primarily analysts, and many of them at state and local fusion centers – in 45 states, the District of Columbia and seven federal agencies to share sensitive homeland security information and analytic products on a daily basis. The HS SLIC Steering Group, comprised primarily of local and state officials, provides governance to the initiative. In addition to the secure information sharing portal that is used, HS SLIC members conduct a virtual meeting every week via the secure portal and by teleconference, to discuss current and emerging threats and analytic topics. DHS also hosts national HS SLIC analytic conferences and regional conferences at both the classified and unclassified level. At these conferences, participants discuss important analytic topics and threat trends, such as border security and threats to critical infrastructure. An HS SLIC Advisory Board has also been established as a subset of the HS SLIC Steering Group. I serve as an At-Large Member of the Advisory Board, which provides advice on issues affecting the intelligence and information sharing relationship between DHS and the state and local intelligence community. The Advisory board just completed its third meeting with Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Charlie Allen, Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence Mary Connell, and members of their staff. By all accounts provided to me, those who participate in HS SLIC find it to be a highly valuable initiative that provides information and context that is otherwise not readily available to them. Many of the participants attribute the success of this initiative to the dedicated staff members that are assigned to it. I have been especially encouraged by the efforts of the DHS staff to integrate HS SLIC, where possible, with other existing initiatives. Specifically, authentication to the HS SLIC information portal can now be accomplished not only by using the HS SLIC log-on and authentication procedure, but also by using the log-on credentials associated with the Global Federated Identity and Privilege Management (GFIPM) framework, a joint effort of many local, state, and federal government agencies. Affiliated with the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative that I mentioned earlier, the GFIPM framework provides the justice community and partner organizations with a standards-based approach for implementing federated identity. This willingness by DHS I&A to integrate with and leverage existing and

developing information sharing initiatives is to be commended.

Although not an exhaustive list, the examples provided above have served to improve our homeland security information sharing capabilities.

WHAT CAN BE IMPROVED: CHALLENGES TO INFORMATION SHARING

While acknowledging the progress above, local and state officials recognize that much more needs to be accomplished, and that room for improvement remains. Next, I will identify some of these issues that affect homeland security information sharing, based in input from others.

Uncertain sustainment funding for fusion centers. Local and state officials consistently and emphatically note that one of the most significant threats to effective homeland security information sharing – perhaps *the* most significant threat – is the potential lack of sustainment funding for fusion centers. The President’s National Strategy for Information Sharing describes the commitment to fusion centers as a “national priority,” yet the current DHS grant guidance falls short of fully supporting this priority. State and local recipients of DHS grants can use grant funds to hire and retain intelligence analysts for three years, as long as the agencies make an up-front commitment to pay 100% of the sustainment costs for intelligence analysts – but at the risk of losing all federal funding in the future. This leaves many local and state officials in a serious quandary. State and local officials are willing to seek other sources of funding to help sustain this indispensable network of fusion centers. But state and local officials cannot immediately predict if they will be successful in securing this funding from other sources – and if they cannot arrange these other sources of funding, they will be disqualified from hiring analysts with federal funds in future program years.⁴ One fusion center leader plainly pointed out:

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program*, 2008, Accessed September 21, 2008 at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy08_hsgp_guide.pdf.

“Frankly, [*our fusion center*] is coming down to the wire regarding the 2008 grant. Our local agencies who have staff in the [*fusion center*] have told us that if they are held to the requirement of promising to sustain staff beyond the 2008 grant period in order to accept funding then they will opt out. The House of Representatives has responded by passing H.R. 6098 but I have heard nothing regarding movement in the Senate on this issue and whether or not if something is passed, will it have any tangible affect on the 2008 guidance. For [*our fusion center*] time is running out with a pending deadline for the local agencies to make application and no idea yet what to tell them other than there has been no change.”⁵

I’m confident that officials at the DHS I&A State and Local Program Office support the sustainment of State and Local Fusion Centers. Those officials have been working hard to finalize the approval of the *Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers*, which should help focus sustainment funding on achieving these baseline capabilities. Still, the present circumstances jeopardize the existence of many fusion centers, and thus put effective homeland security information sharing in the United States at risk. The current requirements also endanger long-term effectiveness, and place limits on our ability to sustain a “culture of constitutionality” and effectiveness by retaining trained and qualified staff. Numerous local and state officials have advocated for designated federal grant funding for fusion center sustainment until other funding sources are identified.

A continued lack of coordination across and among national information systems.

Many local and state agencies still decry the multitude of systems that local and state officials must access and use to stay informed. Ultimately, the result can be inefficiency and information overload. As one local officer responded:

⁵ Communication from local/state official to the author, in response to request for information, September 2008.

“My one big complaint is that we don't yet have a single place to go for information . . . I have, by the way, nearly 30 passwords to change every quarter . . . If the US Government was to truly increase the law enforcement role in intelligence – both for criminal and homeland security issues – SOMEONE needs to tell all these folks that enough is enough. Get on one website where I can get a criminal history on a guy, a gun trace, find where the alien came from and when, and find suspicious activity reports for financial information. Something like that would save time and money on a scale I can't even fathom . . . What should take 30 seconds takes 30 minutes . . .”⁶

Another state law enforcement leader noted:

“. . . my shop is really reaching overload on all of the information sources we have to monitor on a daily basis to keep current. It seems that many of these . . . are sponsored by various federal agencies . . . Each one requires a separate sign in . . . I can't help but think there has to be a better way to share information.”⁷

Finally, a state fusion center official said:

“The maturation of *[existing systems]* has enabled analysts and investigators to access more information than they had previously. Other *[new information]* resources . . . provide a wealth of information. The next step would be to consolidate some of these sources into a coherent, streamlined manner so that analysts wouldn't have to check 10 websites to gather information.”⁸

National security clearances: issuance and reciprocity. Clearance issues still plague local and state officials. Responses from the field suggest that the process still takes too

⁶ Communication from local/state official to the author, in response to request for information, September 2008.

⁷ Communication from local/state official to the author, in response to request for information, September 2008.

⁸ Communication from local/state official to the author, in response to request for information, September 2008.

long, and that clearances granted by one federal agency are frequently not recognized by another. Finally, the sharing of important homeland security information continues to be hampered by overclassification, and the proportionately small number of clearances that can be issued to local officials. Local and state officials pointed out that front-line police officers, detectives, and their immediate supervisors are left uninformed because overclassification prevents important information from being shared. Similarly, a respondent shared his concerns that some in the federal government believe – incorrectly – that they are sharing information widely with state and local law enforcement through such classified channels as HSDN and NCTC Online. Unfortunately, the vast majority of law enforcement agencies don't have these secure networks, and many believe that most of the 18,000 local and state law enforcement agencies in the U.S. never will.

The lack of a pervasive “responsibility to provide” culture among agencies. Local and state officials in some jurisdictions said that information affecting local communities is still not routinely shared with appropriate officials. They attribute this to the fact that a limiting, strict, and overpowering “need to know” approach, rather than a “need to share” or “responsibility to provide” culture, is still prominent in some jurisdictions.

Unrealistic expectations. In the words of one fusion center official, achieving baseline capabilities for fusion centers will take five to seven years, especially with limited sustainment resources. Local and state officials pointed out that attempting to develop and implement a long-term homeland security information sharing strategy without a stable funding mechanism poses substantial obstacles and unrealistic expectations. They note that while the baseline capabilities provide an excellent implementation guide, the baseline capabilities will have little impact on day-to-day operations if they aren't connected to sustainment funding. The baseline capabilities also create a substantial amount of administrative work to facilitate a long-term strategy, develop policies and protocols, collection requirements, staff training plans, and establish continuity of operations and other contingency plans, which may require the hiring of project managers or other staff.

Non traditional information sharing remains undeveloped. Some local and state officials saw the need for more emphasis on information sharing with the private sector, including funding to develop private sector training programs. It was noted that the private sector may see trends before the public sector, so effective relationships are critical for homeland security information sharing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

These observations provide us with an opportunity to begin identifying the way ahead. Much has been accomplished since September 11, 2001, and significant progress has been made toward improved homeland security information sharing. All of us are mutually interested in continuing the progress that we have jointly achieved. I turn now to some recommendations that might help us all continue to move forward together.

Support and build on the existing partnerships that have been effective. Among the most effective partnerships are those borne from, or associated with organizations that are part of, the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, and in particular with the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. Funding and other support to Global's efforts reinforces the work of all stakeholders in homeland security information sharing. These participating organizations are inclusive in their approach; much of the work thus far in coordinating homeland security information sharing among local, state, tribal, and federal agencies has been done by Global, the CICC, and organizations who participate in these joint efforts.

Continue to make the protection of privacy and civil liberties a top priority. As we continue to establish a national, integrated network of fusion centers it is essential that we put "first things first." Together, all of us must continue to emphasize the importance of systemic and institutionalized protections to privacy and civil liberties. Awareness, training, and accountability measures in this area are critical to our continued success.

Simplify funding. For many recipients, decisions about grant funding are mysterious or

even nonsensical. Provide grant recipients with the needed flexibility to sustain the fusion center programs that serve their jurisdictions, consistent with the provisions found in H.R. 6098.

Aggressively promote intelligence-led policing. Consistent with an earlier proposal contained in this Subcommittee’s LEAP report published in 2006, homeland security information sharing would benefit from a coordinated, consortium approach – rather than individual, disconnected efforts – to foster and promote intelligence-led policing in the United States. The concept has proven successful in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere. Although it’s true that the number of law enforcement agencies in those countries is far fewer than the 18,000 that exist in the U.S., implementation of intelligence-led policing might be manageable and effective if first introduced in the 50 to 100 fusion centers in America. This implementation could focus on two areas: (1) establishing and coordinating information about the criminal intelligence priorities (or priority information needs – much like a “criminal intelligence priorities framework”) of local, tribal, and state jurisdictions, and providing these priority information needs to federal agencies; and (2) emphasizing and strengthening the analytic capacity in local, tribal, and state agencies. Our overall effectiveness in sharing homeland security information will be hampered until we establish clear and prioritized information needs, and unless we develop effective analytic capacity in selected agencies.

Integrate information systems. In 2003, the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* highlighted the many disaggregated information sharing systems in the United States, and called for the creation of a more integrated approach to these systems. Five years later, some progress has been made in this regard, but the proliferation of systems continues. More attention needs to be directed toward interoperable and interconnected systems. Global has done extensive work in this area, but additional resources directed to these projects could accelerate the development of solutions to support end users.

Increase training capacity. State and local officials suggested building on the success of existing training programs, and expanding training to more police officers,

investigators and analysts. Effective training is crucial to increasing our capacity to improve homeland security information sharing at the ground level. Valuable training exists in the federal arena, and it could be expanded so that more of it is provided to local, tribal, and state agencies. Some local and state agencies have encouraged an emphasis on mobile training as a delivery mechanism.

Revisit persistent challenges that remain unresolved. Some topics that were raised as challenges or problems seven years ago – such as issues surrounding clearances, or cultural barriers that affect information sharing – continue to surface. It’s imperative to revisit, understand, and obtain resolution to each of these longstanding issues.

Move faster. Following the attacks of 9/11/2001, we moved with a great deal of urgency. Today, in some areas we are moving much more slowly. Perhaps we need to remember that today’s adversaries move more swiftly than those of the past. A renewed sense of urgency will help all of us maintain the momentum we need to improve our efforts to share homeland security information.

CONCLUSION

As with other important issues surrounding homeland security information sharing, there is much work to do. Hearings such as this one help all of us focus on the work that remains. On behalf of the colleagues with whom I work at all levels of government, we appreciate the support for and interest in homeland security information sharing, and in the protection of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights, that has been consistently demonstrated by this Subcommittee.

I pledge my continued support of our important work together. Thank you for your time, and I look forward to any questions you may have.